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ABSTRACT 
The National Federation of Canadian University Students (NFCUS) 
and the Canadian Union of Students (CUS) had historicity; that is, they 
helped transform the field of historical action by convincing business, 
government, university administrators and public opinion on the need for 
mass student-aid programs and low tuition fees. From the 1950s to the 
mid-1960s, NFCUS and CUS campaigned for government-funded mass 
student-aid; in fact, it was their number one "national affairs" concern. 
Governments responded to the NFCUS and CUS accessibility lobby 
with the Canada Student Loan Program (CSLP) in 1964, the Ontario 
Student Assistance Plan (OSAP) in 1966 and "frozen" tuition fees by 
1967. The achievement of the CSLP divided Quebec and English-
Canadian students and began a process of removing traditional student 
movement catalysts. NFCUS's and CUS's lobby for non-repayable stu-
dent bursaries was co-opted. However, the level of accessibility to post-
secondary education was unprecedented and, in part, provided the social 
conditions for the emergence of new social movements. 
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RÉSUMÉ 
La Fédérat ion nationale des étudiants universitaires canadiens 
(FNEUC) et la Fédération canadienne des étudiants (FCE) avaient de 
l'historicité, c'est-à-dire qu'elles participèrent dans la transformation du 
champ d'action historique en convainquant le monde des affaires, les 
gouvernements, les administrateurs d'universités et l'opinion publique 
qu'une diminution dans les frais de scolarité et une augmentation dans 
les bourses pour les étudiants étaient des besoins réels. A partir des 
années 1950 jusqu 'au milieu des années 1960, la FNEUC et la FCE 
travaillèrent pour une augmentation de l'assistance aux étudiants et aux 
étudiantes par les différents niveaux de gouvernement; en effet, c'était 
l eur p r e m i è r e p r é o c c u p a t i o n dans les a f f a i r e s n a t i o n a l e s . Les 
gouvernements canadien et ontarien répondirent aux demandes de la 
FNEUC et de la FCE avec la création du Programme canadien de prêts 
aux étudiants (PCPE) en 1964 et du Régime d 'a ide financière aux 
étudiants de l'Ontario (RAFEO) en 1966 ainsi qu'avec un engagement 
de fixer les frais de scolarité en 1967. La réussite de la PCPE occasionna 
une division entre les corps étudiants québécois et canadien anglais, 
précipitant un processus de disparition des catalyseurs traditionnels du 
mouvement étudiant. La poussée de la FNEUC et de la FCE >pour la 
création de bourses sans restitution fut saboté. Néanmoins, le niveau 
d 'access ib i l i té aux études postsecondaires était sans précédent, et 
contribua aux conditions sociales favorables à l'apparition de nouveaux 
mouvements sociaux. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, I discuss the results of my research on the National 
Federation of Canadian University Students (NFCUS) and the Canadian 
Union of Students (CUS) in the 1950s and 1960s. With particular atten-
tion to Ontario, I focus on NFCUS and (early) CUS between the years 
1955 to 1966. I examine briefs presented to state agents such as politi-
cians, university administrators and various commissions, and most 
importantly, how state agents responded to these briefs. I also examine 
the opinions of former student leaders. 
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My main argument is that student activism led to increased university 
accessibility and this, in turn, helped form the field of historical action or 
policy environment for the next half century. The availability of student 
loans and bursaries can be considered a type of state co-optation that had 
mixed results. When I use the term "co-optation" here, I do not mean in 
zero-sum terms, as simply "co-optation by the state" where all opposition 
is demobilized. It is clear, for example, that the availability of student-aid 
after the mid-1960s increased accessibility and helped determine student 
activism in the late 1960s and beyond. 
The NFCUS, or simply "NFCUS" (pronounced either with a "nif " 
sound, or a "nuf," sound) worked on behalf of Canadian university stu-
dents after it formed in 1927. Student delegates elected from local NFCUS 
committees and student councils met biannually. During the Second World 
War, NFCUS stopped operating, but started again immediately after the 
war to begin its lobby for accessibility. NFCUS leaders became keen par-
ticipants in international student politics and developed a substantial pro-
gram of "services," including life insurance, student discounts, student 
exchanges and national competitions (UWO Gazette, 1955b). NFCUS 
changed its constitution and name to the Canadian Union of Students 
(CUS) in 1963 after achieving, momentarily, a French and English student 
organization that recognized the fundamental bi-nationalism of the 
Canadian state. This arrangement crumbled a year later. 
Around 1968, many student councils reacted negatively to CUS's 
radicalization. Rather than staying and working within the organization, 
they sponsored successful withdrawal referenda and effectively 
destroyed CUS. "Fighting brush fires," as one former NFCUS President 
called it, was nothing new to national student politics (for example, see 
Winsor, 1958), only this time the withdrawals all came at once. CUS 
ceased operations in 1969. Ad hoc national meetings of student councils 
continued, and in 1972 the National Union of Students (NUS) was 
formed. NUS changed its name to the Canadian Federation of Students 
(CFS) in 1981. Today's Canadian Federation of Students (CFS) is there-
fore part of a long, almost continual tradition of national student organi-
zation going back to 1927. 
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In the early to mid-1950s, the public was predominantly opposed to 
government funding of scholarships and student-aid. This opposition is 
evident in the negative response to the federal Liberal government's 
Canada Council scholarship programs that were established in 1956. 
Granatstein (1986) believes that the Canada Council, despite its strategic 
importance for developing Canadian scholarship, was a contributing 
factor in the federal Liberal election defeats of 1957 and 1958. Most vot-
ers were appalled that their government would fund such a frivolous 
enterprise when, according to Granatstein, the needs of veterans and 
pensioners were generally seen as more important. Sheffield's (1955) 
university enrolment projections, which suggested that market forces 
alone would produce high enrolment, was another important factor mak-
ing student-aid a low priority for most politicians throughout the 1950s. 
By the early 1960s, public opinion had reversed. Support for 
student-aid was everywhere. As I will show, student activism played a 
major role in this reversal. NFCUS leaders' willingness to struggle for 
social justice — albeit from a white, male, heterosexual and able-bodied 
perspective — was a central reason why the public, university adminis-
trators, businessmen and politicians reversed their opinion on mass stu-
dent-aid in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Jacques Gérin, NFCUS 
President 1959-60, (personal communication, 1992) typifies the position 
of national student leaders in the 1950s and early 1960s: 
The first and foremost [issue] was more money for education, 
namely scholarships for students, accessibility to education. 
We argued for reduced costs. The issue in those days was that 
university education was for a reserved lot: privileged stu-
dents who had the means. And that meant only 8% of the stu-
dent-aged population was at university. So at all levels — 
provincially, nationally — that was the big fight — to open up 
university education. 
NFCUS members were the most persistent lobbyists on the issue of stu-
dent-aid, and for a time the only lobbyists. Through its efforts, NFCUS 
had a profound impact on Canadian society. 
NFCUS and CUS leaders were, in part, mediators of class and 
generation-related conflicts. Young men and women of working class 
and intermediate strata origins experienced social conflict with the 
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bourgeoisie, represented by certain university administrators and politi-
cians of previous generations (see Axelrod, 1982; Barkans & Pupo, 
1978). I do not overly concern myself here with debates over social class 
relations and politics (see Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich, 1977, 1978). In the 
terms of French sociologist Alain Touraine, I attempt instead to describe 
how a socially subordinate, predominantly middle-stratum, pre-baby-
boom generation of youth produced changes in social relations and cul-
tural orientations. These relations and orientations are seen most readily 
in the form and practice of government policy and subsequent form and 
practice of student politics. 
Students in the 1950s and 1960s came mostly from a contradictory 
and expanding middle stratum. They did not constitute a coherent social 
class, yet they were being groomed to become a new technological and 
managerial elite. The political form that student organizations took and 
the political alliances their leaders established, allowed them to play a 
pivotal role in the determination of welfare state policy. In other words, 
the younger generation had historicity. This focus on historicity is part of 
a broader paradigmatic shift underway in sociology, and particularly in 
the sociology of childhood and youth. According to James and Prout 
(1997), a focus on children or youth as "active social beings, construct-
ing and creating social relationships" (p. 23) rather than pre-social 
beings in various stages of development, constitutes part of a "new para-
digm." In the next section, I explore this repositioning of young people 
in social analysis; after that, I discuss my methods. Then I provide a 
detailed description of the NFCUS and CUS lobby for student-aid. 
RECENT LITERATURE ON 
CANADIAN YOUTH AND STUDENT MOVEMENTS 
Cyril Levitt's (1984) study of Canadian student movements of the 
"sixties" glossed over important transformative social relations of the 
1950s to mid-1960s: the development of "accessibility." While Levitt 
has added a great deal to our knowledge of Canadian student history, 
his inattention to students' concern with accessibility, as well as the 
lasting and significant social effect this had, creates a serious flaw in 
his analysis of late 1960s Canadian student politics. Levitt does not 
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acknowledge how changes in student-aid programs had a major struc-
turing effect on student organization and the field of historical action. 
Other examples of student-driven policies that had this structuring 
effect include the easing of in loco parentis regulations1 in the early 
1960s, stable tuition-fee levels established by 1967, and student repre-
sentation on university decision-making bodies gained in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. 
Levitt completely ignores NFCUS. Knowledge of NFCUS and early 
CUS's prolonged struggle for accessibility and how Canadian state 
agents responded to this struggle, is crucial for understanding the subse-
quent development and transformation of Canadian student politics. 
Kostash (1980) documents the development of Canada's new left — the 
anti-nuclear and community-organizing movements — of the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, but, like Levitt, overlooks the important formative 
influence of NFCUS. Doug Owram's (1996) recent generation approach 
to "youth radicalism in the sixties" makes exactly the same mistake as 
Kostash and Levitt; he is oblivious to NFCUS and the way it changed 
the historical field of action. The oversights of Kostash, Levitt and 
Owram are serious, especially in light of my claim that NFCUS historic-
ity is key to understanding subsequent student movements. 
For Owram (1996, pp. ix-xi), the influence of the baby boom 
derives from four main "historical forces:" (1) its relative size; (2) the 
affluence its members enjoyed; (3) its "link to the turbulent decade" [the 
1960s]; and (4) the boomers' "expectations that they would have a spe-
cial effect." Owram's demographic and economic explanations — the 
first two "historical forces" — offer nothing original. This position is 
standard in the much larger U.S. literature. Altbach (1981) being exem-
plary. What is original, however, is his focus on Canadian youth in the 
1945-1970 period. Thus his work partially corrects what Goldson (1997) 
refers to as relations of "marginalization and exclusion" of children and 
youth, in this case, in the historical surveys of Canada. Owram, unfortu-
nately, does not develop theoretically or empirically his fourth "histori-
cal force," which borders on an agency perspective for its concern with 
youthful "expectations." Owram, echoing Foot and Stoffman (1996), 
tends toward demographic reductionism, with the cultural form of late 
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1960s "youth radicalism" being explained mainly as the sheer force of a 
large and affluent generation. Owram improperly acknowledges youth 
culture itself as an agent of social change and thus fetters our understand-
ing of the dynamics of contemporary youth-adult and youth-state rela-
tions. If Foot and Stoffman are right, that "demographics are two-thirds 
of everything," then the "other third," so to speak, is human agency. 
I agree generally with Owram that an overall "turbulence" had a 
bearing on 1960s youth movements. However, as he does throughout his 
work, he makes the common mistake of separating actors from events. 
Owram states the following, for example: "[The baby boom generation] 
entered their teens as the emphasis on security and conformity began to 
wear thin" (p. 315). These youth, in fact, challenged the values of secu-
rity and conformity; "security" and "conformity" were not a priori social 
structures that youth "entered." It makes more sense to say youth consti-
tuted a movement that resisted security and conformity. Owram inade-
quately conceptualizes the human subject and the complex ideological 
dispositions of the 1960s baby-boomers. For this reason, his attempt to 
extend his historical analysis to understanding contemporary politics and 
culture is weak. 
For Owram, the national student organization before the mid-1960s 
was a mere "service organization." This is inaccurate. Besides being at 
the forefront of a persistent accessibility movement, NFCUS leaders 
were active in both Soviet and C.I.A.-influenced international student 
organizations, organized national educational "seminars," and discussed 
how to build a "student movement." Moreover, Owram's belief that 
Quebec francophones walked out of NFCUS in 1964 because of rising 
"Quebec separatism" is misleading. As I show below, the situation was 
far more complicated. Unlike Owram, my analysis of student politics is 
philosophically and historically linked to the concerns of the new left 
itself, namely, the co-optation concept, and what or who were the agents 
of change. Owram's review of the events of the "counter-culture" and 
"student radicalism" is interesting and empirically valid. Yet it is overly 
focused on the baby-boom cohort, those, according to Owram, "born 
between the late war and 1956 or 1956" (p. xiv). NFCUS student leaders 
of the 1950s, born in the late 1930s and early 1940s — pre-boomers by 
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Owram's own definition — had, in part, "prefigured" (W. Breines, 1982) 
the social relations of late 1960s youth organizations and movements. It 
was the relatively small generation of pre-boomers who helped form the 
conditions of accessibility and inclusion that made late 1960s student 
radicalism possible. This fact plays down the importance of cohort size 
as a determining factor of cultural shift in the late 1960s, which is a cen-
tral feature Owram's analysis. 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: 
HERBERT MARCUSE AND ALAIN TOURAINE 
The co-optation concept has strong roots in the Marxist tradition, 
especially in the "polymorphous" Marcusian influences on the new left 
(see P. Breines, 1970, 1971). Marcuse's One Dimensional Man (1964) 
and Repressive Tolerance (1965) appeared at a crucial time in the devel-
opment of North American new left student protest in the 1960s. 
Marcuse described how consumerism, mass media and liberal social 
policies were, in fact, co-optive instruments that placated the masses and 
thwarted all forms of dissent. Such ideas had a powerful effect on many 
young people who were beginning to reject the conservative values of 
their parents and to distrust politicians, university administrators and 
business and military leaders alike. North American students, starved for 
a cr i t ical analys is of their society, were natural ly drawn toward 
Marcuse 's views. This is not the place to provide a full account of 
Marcuse's ideas and especially his profound influence on Canadian stu-
dent and youth activists of the mid-to late 1960s. However, a radically 
modified notion of Marcuse's co-optation provides a good departure 
point for my analysis of student politics. 
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, it appeared that Marcuse was right 
— dissent had been thwarted and the masses were placated in a "one-
dimensional" social order. In the wake of the collapse of new left student 
movements and the rise of the "conservative restoration" (Shor 1986), 
it appears that the human subject alone was too weak to counter techno-
cratic and anti-democratic tendencies in mass society. 
In relation to this essentially Marcusian viewpoint, which reduced 
the human subject to an all-powerful social order, Bowles and Gintis 
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produced their influential Schooling in Capitalist America (1976). 
Moreover, in most North American departments of sociology, the legacy 
of Talcot Parsons and functionalism lived on, reinforcing liberalism as 
the dominant world view. Yet despite these anti-humanist, structure-
emphasizing theories, there was always an undercurrent of denial; the 
human subject was, in fact, doing unexpected things. It was inventing 
language and changing social relations in unanticipated ways, often 
without any centralized control. The actual activities of people in social 
movements always seemed at odds with theory. This was certainly the 
case with Marcuse's mid-1960s theories, which were popularized and 
disputed by student activists from the time they appeared (for examples, 
see Harding, 1969, and W. Breines, 1982). People struggled for social 
justice almost as if they were attempting to show that there was some-
thing wrong with the popular Marcusian notions of "establishment" and 
"selling out." Despite so-called co-optation, it was clear that the univer-
sity and society had experienced tremendous change. So it is in this so 
far unnamed and undocumented tradition of battling with the legacy of 
pessimistic Marcusian theory that this paper is located. One could go 
further and say that this paper speaks to all such theories that do not 
place the actor or the subject in a central position in social analysis. 
Unlike Marcuse, I take a fluid, multi-dimensional approach to "co-
optation." I maintain that social relations of power are not simply repro-
duced, even though dissent may be reduced temporarily. I see 
co-optation as a fundamental shift in social relations — with ambiguous 
winners and losers, not a zero-sum situation with "one-dimensionalism" 
prevailing. I see the social relations between student organizations and 
the state as "the material condensation of a relationship of forces" 
(Poulantzas 1978, p. 152) rather than as Marcuse would have, as a rela-
tionship that continually reinforces the status quo through a process of 
capital-centred integration. So, for example, a Marcusian theorist would 
view student-aid as just another means for incorporating the subordinate 
classes into a "one dimensional society." Any dissenting movements 
claiming that the university is elitist would be easily thwarted, as would 
be any popular socialist revolt. My analysis is more nuanced. I agree 
with Marcuse that there is a process of incorporating dissent. However, 
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in my view, student-aid produces a variety of revised political alliances 
and possible socio-cultural outcomes. This will be made clear in my 
descriptions of historical events. One has to see how social movements 
of dissent are not simply demobilized and defused. Subordinate social 
actors can instigate significant changes in state relations that do not nec-
essarily benefit dominant social actors' interests over the long-term. The 
state and society are viewed less as an unchanging, one-dimensional 
order that absorbs all forms of dissent, and more as a social relation that 
is prone to transformation by social movements guided by values and 
cultural orientations. 
For me, co-optation is a social process that describes how govern-
ment activity and student activism as "institutional forms and social 
practices" (Jessop, 1982) mediate and mutually determine each other. 
Both "sides" co-opt each other so to speak, albeit with unequal results. 
Touraine's (1988, 1995) concepts of historicity, cultural orientations and 
the production of society are useful here. Institutional change occurs in 
part because of social agency, an example being when Canadian students 
convinced politicians and university administrators for mass student-aid. 
To the degree that social relations are transformed according to the inter-
ests, values and cultural orientations of a particular agent, that agent is 
said to have historicity. NFCUS and CUS played a major role in forming 
a political alliance between subordinate and dominant social agents. 
Student leaders convinced ruling elites of the benefits of student-aid, 
which increased accessibility to education and influenced class and other 
social formations. The social policies that condensed were not exactly 
what NFCUS was demanding — loans instead of non-repayable grants 
— because the policies were a mediation of divergent class-related inter-
ests. As Axelrod (1982) points out, "democratic and economic benefits" 
of postsecondary education were virtually indistinguishable (p. 28). The 
student-aid lobby allowed "those with different interests and competing 
political persuasions" to come together for the common purpose of 
expanding the university. Undoubtedly, the fact that certain business-
men, university administrators and federal and provincial politicians 
actually held the same moral views as students, despite their class and 
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generation differences, was an important factor for providing students 
with the political space to produce themselves. 
Student demands stimulated state action, which led to new "policy 
environments" in which student leaders tried again to rally more support. 
Over time, student social movement helped produce a class-related insti-
tutional shift that helped consolidate the new hegemonic conditions of 
the welfare state. State power was achieved when the "state as an institu-
tional ensemble" (Jessop, 1982, p. 229) adjusted to student and other 
personal rights and henceforth conditioned the formation of subsequent 
social movements. Governments "took students seriously" and thus con-
solidated their hold on political power. Just as student-aid was provided 
to veterans in part to diffuse any possibility of a revival of late-1930s 
style worker radicalism (Brint & Karabel, 1989), dominant class agents 
aimed again to defuse a potentially threatening situation while they 
worked with students in the 1950s to mid-1960s. 
During co-optation, the social relations of the state are transformed. 
This determines the field of historical action, favouring the dominant 
social force's ability to realize its interests over those of the subordinate 
social force. But the capability for further action, is not de facto elimi-
nated or totally absorbed, as in pessimistic Marcusian analysis. Instead, 
co-optation or mutual determination transforms social relations, creating 
new possibilities and conditions for social intervention. 
Student-aid and low tuition fees, of course, were not the only means 
by which the state controlled, shaped and channeled dissent. The strate-
gic use of accessibility policy should also be seen in relation to the 
influence of mass media on student movements (see Cohen, 1972; 
Gitlin, 1980) and to the federal Liberal's volunteer youth corps, the 
Company of Young Canadians, a group that was created in 1965 and 
which effectively took control of the Student Union for Peace Action's 
new left community organizing projects (Daly, 1970). There is also the 
issue of surveillance (Clearwater, 1998; Kostash, 1980) and infiltration 
and disruption (Churchill & Vanderwall, 1990; Stern, 1967). 
Student-aid and low tuition fees did not simply undermine NFCUS 
and CUS, and later, new left student movements. Student-aid and low 
tuition fees transformed social relations and reorganized hegemony in 
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line with capitalist principles and assumptions — but with unpredictable 
results, even as I write. Despite its serious faults, accessibility policy did 
help diversify the social composition of student populations throughout 
the 1960s (Anisef, 1985). In this sense, NFCUS and CUS of the 1950s 
and mid-1960s can be said to have helped produce the new left student 
movements of the late 1960s and the various personal rights struggles of 
the 1970s and beyond. Furthermore, this paper corrects the failure of his-
torians to consider the political role of NFCUS and CUS in the formation 
of the Canadian welfare state (see, for example, Bothwell, Drummond & 
English, 1981; Finkel, 1977; Granatstein, 1986; Guest, 1980). 
RESEARCH METHODS 
I looked at past student agency through its various representations: 
letters and articles in student newspapers, public statements, briefs, 
reports, commissions, manifestos, citations in the Ontario Legislature, 
the House of Commons, Cabinet minutes and student protests. I aug-
mented my analysis of student agency by obtaining information through 
fifteen interviews with former student leaders, mostly presidents of the 
national organizations and key full-time staff, between 1955 and 1965. I 
focused on primary sources and interviews because of the practical 
absence of any analytical literature dealing with my period of interest. 
Student newspapers were as valuable a source of information as 
interviews. Unlike in human memory, the ideas in them remained as 
detailed today as the day they appeared in print. Letters to the editor sec-
tions were particularly useful for providing a range of opinion while edi-
torials, despite their biases, were useful for summarizing issues and 
providing analyses of key conflicts. 
I retrieved the names of student leaders from NFCUS and CUS 
minutes . Many of these people were found in recent edi t ions of 
"Canada 's Who 's Who." With this information I was able to easily 
locate them. During the interviews, I was usually able to find the 
whereabouts of other former leaders. NFCUS and early CUS executives 
and staff members all went on to prestigious careers in government, 
business, law, labour and higher education, the historical and social 
effects of which are beyond the immediate concern of this work. So the 
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former student voices herein are those of people who have since 
attained a great deal of social status and insight into the Canadian state. 
Space does not permit a full analysis of the interviews. I detected 
memory lapses and post-experience memory interference. Yet it was 
clear from the minimally directed, opening section of my interviews, 
that the three top issues that former student leaders felt passionate about 
were: (1) the lobby for accessibility, (2) international student politics 
and (3) simply keeping their organization alive. My interview data cor-
roborate data I obtained in the student newspapers and NFCUS and 
CUS documents. 
A full-scale account of all the actors whose agency led to a given 
policy is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, I do not claim that either 
NFCUS or CUS or its provincial components were the sole agency in 
policy formation. Student leaders were taken seriously by some univer-
sity administrators and politicians in various ways, at various times, and 
for various reasons. However, there was a widespread inability of many 
adults in positions of power to take student leaders seriously. Student 
organizations were far from the direct apparatuses of decision-making, 
yet their activities and political positions were responded to in calculated 
ways. While NFCUS and CUS alone did not achieve accessibility policy, 
undoubtedly they were key social agents, edging bureaucrats and univer-
sity administrators on at every opportunity. 
THE NFCUS LOBBY FOR STUDENT-AID 
The NFCUS of the late 1940s and early 1950s was not just a straight-
forward continuation of the rather conservative NFCUS of the 1930s (see 
Axelrod, 1989, for discussion of NFCUS in 1930s). In the late 1930s, it 
was the Canadian Student Assembly (CSA), founded in 1938, not the 
NFCUS that pursued a campaign to pressure the federal government to 
provide a thousand student bursaries worth $500 each. So the post-war 
NFCUS was really an heir to the CSA and NFCUS of the 1930s. There is 
need for more historical documentation of NFCUS before and after the 
war, but it is clear that after re-establishing itself in 1947, NFCUS (1947) 
passed a resolution asking for "federal and provincial authorities to 
secure scholarships and bursaries for Canadian Students..." 
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In 1950, on behalf of NFCUS, student leaders from the University of 
Montreal submitted briefs to the Royal Commission on National 
Deve lopment in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (the Massey 
Commission). NFCUS leaders deplored the condition of student funding 
and asked provincial and federal governments for a system of bursaries 
(Neatby 1992, 1993). The Commission recommended in its 1951 final 
report a "national system of scholarships which should be founded on 
adequate federal aid" (Martin, Hammond, & Arthurs, 1958). But the rec-
ommendation was ignored. "It was 1950 before NFCUS became an 
"issue" [this was when] ideas of national scholarships were first really 
set in motion. . ." (Smyth, 1955). Certainly by 1954, if not earlier, 
NFCUS was making annual presentations to provincial and federal gov-
ernments asking for student bursaries (Brewer, 1955). 
Despite much effort by NFCUS leaders, no substantial government 
action on student-aid occurred until the Canada Student Loan Program 
(CSLP) in 1964. The Ontario government instituted only minor 
increases in student-aid throughout the 1950s and early 1960s (see 
Tables 1 and 2). Student-aid was a low priority for the Progressive 
Conservative federal government (1957-1963) and the Liberal govern-
ment (1935-1957) before it, except for student veterans' assistance, the 
distant cousin of the CSLP. The Department of Veterans Affairs 
University Training Allowance was the most important government pro-
gram to improve accessibility during and after the Second World War 
and the Korean War. In the 1949-50 academic year, for example, veter-
ans made up 21% of university enrolment in Canada; in 1950-51, 11%; 
in 1951-52, 7% (Department of Veteran's Affairs, 1952, see also Moses, 
1995). University calendars made the student-aid situation appear a lot 
better than it actually was, as they still do today. Countering this façade, 
post-war NFCUS leaders consistently pointed out that bursary disburse-
ments were too small to encourage the "economically disadvantaged" to 
attend university. Financial aid to students before CSLP clearly played a 
key role for impoverished students. However, it is also clear that many 
bright students missed the opportunity of higher education or were ham-
pered in their attempt to become educated because of their family's poor 
financial situation. 
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Table 1 
Total Scholarships and Bursaries Awarded Under Provincial and 
Dominion-Provincial student-aid Programs in Ontario, 1947-48 
to 1965-66* 
Y e a r N u m b e r A m o u n t A v . V a l u e % o f s tuden ts 
r ece iv ing aid 
1 9 4 7 ^ 8 735 $ 1 7 6 , 5 1 0 $ 2 4 0 2.5 
1 9 4 9 - 5 0 8 8 6 $ 2 0 3 , 6 2 0 $ 2 2 9 3 .4 
1 9 5 1 - 5 2 1,130 $ 2 5 2 , 7 6 2 $ 2 2 3 5.3 
1 9 5 3 - 5 4 1,292 $ 2 7 6 , 4 0 0 $ 2 1 3 6.8 
1 9 5 5 - 5 6 1,450 $392 ,441 $ 2 7 0 6.7 
1 9 5 7 - 5 8 1,962 $ 4 7 7 , 5 8 3 $ 2 4 3 7.6 
1 9 5 9 - 6 0 3 ,711 $1 ,002 ,447 $ 2 7 0 12.6 
1 9 6 0 - 6 1 4 ,375 $1 ,156 ,162 $ 2 6 4 13.6 
1 9 6 1 - 6 2 4 , 8 1 3 $ 1 , 3 9 5 , 0 0 0 $ 2 8 9 13.4 
1 9 6 2 - 6 3 5 ,481 $1 ,624 ,302 $ 2 9 6 14.0 
1 9 6 3 - 6 4 6 ,486 $1 ,893 ,092 $291 14.7 
1 9 6 4 - 6 5 7 ,768 $ 2 , 3 3 8 , 8 2 4 $301 15.3 
1 9 6 5 - 6 6 8 ,883 $2 ,809 ,177 $ 3 1 6 15.1 
* From Cook and Stager (1969), except for "% of students receiving aid" which is my 
own calculation. Note: these figures do not include CSLP (a student loan program) 
disbursements. 
Before the CSLP was introduced, the dollar amount of student-aid 
paid out to each recipient increased slightly each year, yet the average 
bursary a "needy" student received did not even cover the tuition fee!2 In 
the academic years between 1949-50 and 1958-59, annual increases in the 
number of students receiving aid was between 0% and 2%, with a 5% leap 
in 1959 and an average of 1% annual increase after that (see Table 1). 
Vanderkamp (1984) showed that in Ontario, real student-aid per student 
(in 1971 dollars)3 went from $58 (1951-52) to $60 (1955-56) to $77 
(1959-60) to $124 (1963-64) to $522 (1967-68). Note that the biggest 
jump came between 1963-64 and 1967-68. This four fold increase, a 
significant jump, was due to CSLP and OSAP. 
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T a b l e 2 
Ontario Student-Aid Loans* (not CSLP or OSAP) 
Y e a r N u m b e r Av . V a l u e % of s tuden ts 
r ece iv ing aid 
1 9 5 9 - 6 0 2 ,198 $421 7.5 
1 9 6 0 - 6 1 3 ,361 $ 4 1 3 10.1 
1 9 6 1 - 6 2 4 , 3 1 2 $ 4 3 2 12.0 
1 9 6 2 - 6 3 5 ,249 $ 4 4 4 13.4 
1 9 6 3 - 6 4 6 ,606 $441 14.9 
1 9 6 4 - 6 5 2 8 9 $ 3 9 6 0.5 
* From Cook and Stager (1969), except for "% of students receiving aid" 
Note: In 1 9 6 4 - 6 5 , the p rogram was wound down and replaced with the Ontar io 
Scholarship and Bursary Assistance Fund and Canada Student Loan Program 
NFCUS's campaign for aid was made difficult as governments were 
always making it appear that every student reform was a "momentous 
occasion." Hence, the most important aspect of "increases" to student-
aid, both minor and major, was always the powerful ideological effect 
they had on predominantly "middle class" students, those fortunate 
enough to already be in university. So there was a tendency among the 
predominantly privileged students to take only a passive interest in 
NFCUS. For most students, student-aid was not a major issue, since it 
seemed that a lot of bursaries and loans were available for those less for-
tunate. NFCUS had many unofficial "members" then — those finan-
cially strapped working class youth that were unable to attend university. 
The main tool NFCUS leaders used to communicate with university 
administrators, boards of governors, politicians and various commissions 
was the brief. Briefs were always based on policy resolutions passed at 
annual NFCUS congresses. After ratification by regionally representative 
executive members, briefs were distributed to local NFCUS committees, 
university administrators and politicians. Whenever possible, NFCUS 
leaders arranged meetings between themselves and university presidents, 
cabinet ministers and other politicians. NFCUS representatives met with 
the Prime Minister, usually on an annual basis. They always pressured 
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for more and larger student bursaries (non-repayable student-aid). 
Briefs, becoming more sophisticated over time, were the most impor-
tant tool for helping transform public opinion and government and 
political party policies. 
In December 1954, NFCUS asked the federal government for a fed-
eral student-aid program costing $5.5 million (UWO Gazette, 1955a). 
The federal Liberal government was not interested, citing problems of 
"constitutionality." This, I believe, conveniently masked other factors 
such as "free enterprise values" that meant students or their families 
would have to pay themselves (Axelrod, 1982). The Constitution did not 
prevent direct federal funding for postsecondary education, for example 
in the Appropriation Acts. Why, then, was "constitutionality" evoked 
when it came to transforming veterans' aid into a broad program of stu-
dent-aid for everyone? By the early 1960s, the big business attitude 
toward accessibility became less strident and more liberal. Axelrod cor-
rectly argues that this change of position was less for moral social justice 
reasons and more due to concerns about economic development and hav-
ing enough human capital (see Bladen, 1965 for a synopsis of big busi-
ness attitudes). While NFCUS leaders were motivated mostly by social 
justice concerns, they also promoted human capital arguments for stu-
dent-aid as part of their lobbying strategy, and, in fact, were constantly 
reminding business, university and political leaders of these arguments 
(see NFCUS 1958 brief, for example). Certainly by 1964, presidents of 
Canada's top two banks supported the proposed student loan act, even if 
it was for self-serving reasons. They "supported it enthusiastically as a 
means of s t rengthening their contacts with s tudents" (Federal 
Government of Canada, 1964b). 
A 1955 meeting between NFCUS leaders and members of the 
Ontario government (UWO Gazette, 1955a)4 and a 1957 "memorandum" 
submitted to the federal government and "political parties and other 
appropriate organizations at all levels" (UWO Gazette, 1957a) typify the 
sort of meetings and activities that happened over and over. They were 
part of NFCUS's ongoing student bursary campaign that slowly gained 
university administrator attention throughout the 1950s. According to 
former NFCUS staff executives (personal communication, 1992-93) 
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much effort was spent on publicizing such meetings, which often gained 
nation-wide press, radio and television coverage. 
In 1956, NFCUS submitted a brief to the Royal Commission on 
Canada's Economic Prospects (the Gordon Commission) (see Martin, 
Hammond, & Arthurs, 1956). NFCUS's submission and verbal presenta-
tion to the Royal Commission was the quintessential beginning of the 
state 's adoption (via the Liberal Party) of NFCUS's number-one 
demand: 10,000 bursaries. The Commission was chaired by a member of 
Canada's business elite, Walter Gordon who, according to his biographer 
Denis Smith (1973), was the Liberal Party's "miracle man," the "archi-
tect of the Liberal Party's reconstruction" (p. 9) after its 1957 and 1958 
defeats. According to Newman (1968), Gordon, unlike many of the old-
line Liberals and businessmen, did not believe the free market to be the 
most appropriate mechanism for allocating the nation's assets. Some 
even accused him of being a "traitor to his class." 
Nothing appeared in the Commission's final reports that referred to 
NFCUS's brief and presentation. The official message to NFCUS was 
clear: if you were poor, you would have to find a job and pay your way 
through university (see Dubé, Howes & McQueen, 1957). However, 
from the verbatim records taken during presentations to the Royal 
Commission, Gordon (p. 8205) was obviously impressed with NFCUS's 
proposal. He stated that it was an interesting submission and that they 
would undertake to think about it very seriously. That he thought about it 
seriously was evident here and later, when he became Finance Minister. 
In an address to a 1960 NFCUS seminar, Gordon (1977) stated: 
we shall have to take much greater care to see that no really 
bright boy or girl is dissuaded from continuing his or her edu-
cation after high school because of financial considerations, 
(p. 349) 
Gordon went on to become a major proponent of student-aid, helped 
draft the 1964 student loan legislation (see Toronto Star, 1963) and intro-
duced it in the House of Commons. 
The business-aligned Royal Commission on Canada's Economic 
Prospects was clearly not interested in bursaries, given that skilled 
labour could be imported, demand for university education would grow 
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and that Canada's economic future would be buoyant (providing lots of 
summer and part- t ime jobs for "less economical ly for tunate") . 
Nevertheless, the Commission was certainly enthralled by the idea of the 
"buy now, pay later" approach, already proven to work in the housing 
and automobile industries. Yet NFCUS leaders' position on loans, as 
seen in the Commission hearings, was that loans were unnecessary given 
that educated people would earn greater incomes and would repay their 
debts to the government through higher income taxes. 
THE 1958 "BRIEF ON GOVERNMENT AID TO HIGHER EDUCATION" 
In 1958, NFCUS leaders produced and widely distributed their 
"Brief on Government Aid to Higher Education." This was NFCUS's 
most sophisticated brief thus far. Walter Tarnopolsky,5 (NFCUS Vice 
President 1955-57 and President 1957-58) stated: 
we had a very good brief in 1958. Glossy, that was really the 
start of the whole student bursary things. There was nothing 
before our brief. And we hammered and hammered every year. 
This was our main plank... Every year we came back to it [bur-
saries] regardless of what other things we did, that was always 
at the top of the agenda, (personal communication, 1992) 
By that year, NFCUS had also developed better relations with university 
presidents and their national association. It had also played a "major 
organizing role" in the first Canadian Conference on Education that cul-
minated in a plenary address by NFCUS President Water Tarnopolsky 
(Canadian Conference on Education Proceedings, 1958, pp. 94-99). 
NFCUS considerably expanded its staff, developed a popular "travel 
department," balanced its budget for the first time in years, and received 
widespread mass media coverage (former NFCUS leaders and staff, per-
sonal communication, 1992-93). Most important for the student-aid 
lobby, all student councils were back in the Federation following a mid-
1950s membership crisis. 
NFCUS leaders used the state's education data to fortify their argu-
ment for greatly increasing student-aid. The 1958 brief made two main 
points: first, industrial and commercial development needed more 
university-trained personnel; second, financial barriers to education were 
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unjust — the principle of "equality of opportunity" was central in the 
NFCUS program of action. The brief stated that only 5% of Canadians 
18 to 24 years old were enrolled in university in 1956-57, compared 
with U.S. universities, in which 20.1% were enrolled. The brief empha-
sized the underdevelopment of the liberal arts and humanities and that 
youth from "low income groups" had a strong psychological aversion to 
taking loans and being in debt. 
The 1958 brief also tackled constitutional issues, a topic of perennial 
sensitivity. Financially healthy federal tax coffers were the most likely 
source of NFCUS's proposed bursary plan, but federal funding for edu-
cation was technically unconstitutional. On one hand, the authors of the 
brief pointed out that federal aid was already accepted in veterans and 
federal-provincial student-aid schemes, and that all that was needed was 
to "bring the scheme [student-aid] up to date." But on the other hand, the 
brief suggested changing federal-provincial taxation fields, the position 
promulgated by Quebec francophone NFCUS members. NFCUS lacked 
consensus on the technicalities of how student-aid should be funded. 
Nevertheless, the dominant position formed by the majority of the 
NFCUS membership (English-Canadian) was for federal aid — no mat-
ter what. This position eventually tore NFCUS apart. 
For the Progressive Conservat ive (PC) federal government 
(1957-62), federal funding for student-aid was out of the question. Why 
was this? First, the Gordon Commission had not made any recommenda-
tions concerning student-aid. This relieved any pressure on the new fed-
eral government to act. Second, in the 1957 and 1958 federal elections, 
with support of Quebec Premier Maurice Duplessis's Union national, a 
large contingent of Quebec PCs was elected (Bothwell, Drummond & 
English, 1981). Duplessis had refused federal funding for education 
from the time such funding was established in 1951 because he and his 
party viewed it as a federal incursion into a provincial jurisdiction. So 
any move to create a federally-funded student-aid program by the federal 
PCs would have been unpopular with the Union national and strained 
support for the PCs in Quebec. There is a third possible factor explaining 
PC inaction on student-aid. As did the old-line Liberals, the PC MPs did 
not feel that getting something for free was a good idea. Student-aid, 
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especially bursaries, would have been contrary to their individualist and 
entrepreneurial values. The actual reasons for inaction on student-aid 
are not important here. What is important is how PC inaction on stu-
dent-aid opened up a tremendous political opportunity opened up for 
the Liberal Party. 
In December, 1962, on the eve of the PC government's 1963 elec-
toral defeat, an ad hoc Cabinet committee was struck to discuss "possi-
ble plans for federal loans to university students and the type of 
announcement that might be made on the subject" (Federal Government 
of Canada, 1962a). It took the committee a mere five days to come up 
with the recommendation (subsequently ignored) that a "$10 million 
loan fund be created" (Federal Government of Canada, 1962b). This 
would have meant an additional $1.5 million per year to provincial loan 
programs that already were contributing $4.5 million annually. The non-
verbatim Cabinet minutes of December 18 mention that a majority of the 
PC Cabinet members believed that this "would not have a significant 
influence on university students." Spending money on building universi-
ties was considered more important or else "there would be no room for 
students." The ad hoc committee considered who would disburse the 
loans, eligibility criteria and how there should be "talks with the 
provinces and further consideration of the appropriate agency to admin-
i s t e r t h e l o a n s . " D e s p i t e t h e c o m m i t t e e ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n to m a k e a n 
announcement in the Commons for a $10 million student loan fund, it is 
clear that the majority in Cabinet was against the idea — the announce-
ment never came. The Cabinet minutes record discussion about how the 
fund would receive criticism from the Province of Quebec, which had 
been critical of the federal Liberal Party's proposed bursary plan. The 
majority opinion of Cabinet was that there was no urgency in proceeding 
with the proposal and that the need to provide these loans to students 
was not critical. The Cabinet minutes report that the ministers concluded 
their discussion by agreeing to discuss the matter of university student 
loans at another meeting. That meeting never came. My interpretation of 
the December 13 and 18 Cabinet meeting minutes was that the PCs were 
desperately attempting to come up with a means of gaining public sup-
port to take some of the wind out of the sails of the obviously popular 
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Liberal student-aid proposals. Yet, evidently, there was still PC support 
for Quebec's position, which was strongly against federal involvement in 
student-aid. 
Unrestricted by the constitutional and political concerns of the fed-
eral government, the PC Ontario government did respond to NFCUS 
pressure, but only in a token manner. In consideration of the publicity of 
NFCUS's campaigns, it was politically prudent for the provincial gov-
ernment to at least appear to be doing something. And besides, as dis-
cussed earlier, the attitude of business leaders and politicians was 
shifting toward support for student-aid. So in 1959, the Ontario govern-
ment introduced Ontario Student-Aid Loans (see Table 2). That this pro-
gram was announced in a provincial election year indicates that the 
government was worried about appearing uncaring toward popular 
(student-driven) concerns. NFCUS leaders were quick to criticize the 
tokenism of the program: it was more about shuffling pre-existing fund-
ing programs than about doing something substantial (The Varsity, 
1959b).6 Note that no changes occurred in federal contributions to stu-
dent-aid between 1953 and 1964. Funding increases came only from 
provincial coffers. During this period, the federal government reim-
bursed the Ontario government for less than 10% of its total student-aid 
costs (Cook & Stager 1969). 
The Ontario government's student loan initiative was half-hearted 
and cosmetic. This was no doubt linked to politicians' recognition of 
growing "demand" while attempting to placate public concern aroused by 
NFCUS's campaign. Ontario Student-Aid Loans were repayable (that is, 
they were not bursaries); they were relatively small in size; and only a 
small number of students actually received them — approximately 7% to 
15% of the student population between the academic years 1957-58 and 
1963-64 (see Table 2). While NFCUS leaders were able to penetrate the 
government's façade, their job of rousing the student body to demand 
more student-aid was made even more difficult because of what was 
essentially clever propaganda. The NFCUS lobby was co-opted by the 
Ontario government which offered a few repayable tidbits. Ontario 
Student-Aid Loans were certainly better than nothing. But this was hardly 
a student-aid program that would attract young, bright, working-class 
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men and women into university, which was NFCUS's explicit intent. It is 
no wonder that a popular Marcusian analysis of co-optation by "the estab-
lishment" pervaded so quickly. 
As student enrolment started to increase in the late 1950s, so did 
NFCUS's budget and its ability to hire more staff. According to the one 
NFCUS insider, there was a "constant struggle to increase [NFCUS 
membership] fees" so that more staff could be hired. NFCUS staff pro-
vided continuity in an organization whose membership and leadership 
changed yearly. With more staff, NFCUS was better able to press gov-
ernments for more student-aid; and later, by the mid-1960s, it provided 
the organizational basis for new left radicalism. 
THE LIBERAL PARTY ADOPTS NFCUS'S BURSARY PROPOSAL 
In December 1960, NFCUS representatives presented their case for 
a national bursary program directly to the Progressive Conservative fed-
eral government — this time to a special committee on education, struck 
to study the constitutional aspects of education (UWO Gazette, 1960). 
Not surprisingly, nothing happened. However, while the Conservative 
MPs listened politely, the Liberal Party, under the moral leadership of 
Walter Gordon and others, made NFCUS's bursary proposal part of their 
election platform — a strategic move. NFCUS was finally having some 
obvious success. Years of struggle, countless meetings and campaigns, 
speaking out and letter writing had, in part, created political conditions 
that politicians eventually could not ignore. Between the 1953 and 1962 
elections, approximately 2,000,000 youth reached voting age (Leacy, 
1983). The PCs tapped this growth with their mid-1950s model parlia-
ment movement (UWO Gazette, 1957b) and the involvement of students 
and youth in "Diefenmania" (see Meisel 1962, pp. 65, 75). But the 
Liberals soon caught on and, evidently, became better at harnessing 
youthful idealism.7 Walter Tarnopolsky (NFCUS President 1957-58) 
summarized the situation: 
Year after year we weren't getting that much of a response [on 
the national bursary proposal]. In the end the student Liberals 
backed it, Liberal government in power, Liberal government 
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gave it to them... Student opinion was not necessarily in sync 
with the rest of the country, remember that for most of my time, 
the PCs were in power [from 1957 to 1963] but I would say 
that the majority of us in the student movement were Liberals 
although there was a mixture [of party allegiances], (personal 
communication, 1992) 
A 1961 issue of the Liberal Party publication, the University Liberal 
(1961), states how the Canadian University Liberal Federation (CULF) 
was "Canada's largest and fastest growing student political movement" 
and how, if elected, the Liberal Party would establish 
an extensive scheme of Canada Scholarships. This will be a 
major step in implementing the principle that education, at the 
university level, should be free to all those who can take advan-
tage of it... The initial program will provide 10,000 awards 
each year, with a value of $ 1,000 each, [emphasis mine] 
By 1962, the Liberal Party's election platform had enshrined the above 
position. The Liberals also promised something in addition to a bursary 
program — a loan-based student-aid fund whereby: 
All qualified university students will be able to borrow if nec-
essary for genuine educational needs. The fund will be inde-
pendently administered. Loans will be interest-free during the 
period of study and for the first year afterwards, and will then 
be repayable, plus interest, within a reasonable period. 
(Carrigan, 1968, p. 265). 
In effect, the Liberal Party adopted NFCUS's student-aid policy. 
However, a key component of NFCUS policy was that aid be in the form 
of non-repayable bursaries. The bursary promise was broken when 
Canada Student Loan Program was established — a loan-only program. 
We can infer that the shift of student support to the Liberal Party 
between 1958 and 1964 was, in part, related to the Liberal Party's 
feigned enthusiasm for NFCUS policy (see Moses 1995, pp. 225-239). 
And further, among other things, that the broken promise to establish 
bursaries provided impetus for some student leaders to embrace a new 
left analysis of co-optation and the establishment. 
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NFCUS AND CUS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 
CANADA STUDENT LOAN PROGRAM (CSLP) LEGISLATION 
In 1964, the student-funding situation changed substantially when 
the Liberal Party established the CSLP.8 CSLP was a major shift in gov-
ernment student-aid policy, unlike changes up to that point. I infer that 
the Liberals' promise of "free" university education made in 1961 was 
designed to be broken. Their real goal after the early 1960s was a low-
cost (to government) loan program. After the Liberals established the 
loans-only CSLP, there was still the chance that they might introduce the 
long-promised mass bursary program. Despite pressure from CUS and 
opposition parties, they never did. 
The 1961 presentation to the federal Cabinet on National Student 
Day, February 19, was the last time NFCUS officially presented its case 
for federally-funded bursaries (see UWO Gazette, 1961, Jan. 27 and Feb. 
17). While the lobby continued at the provincial level, the federal lobby 
was dead. NFCUS passed a resolution that officially ended the federal 
s tudent-aid lobby. Around this time, according to former N F C U S 
Executive Secretary André L'Heureux (personal communication, 1993), 
indépendentiste feeling among francophone Quebec NFCUS members 
seemed to suddenly emerge, especially when it became apparent that the 
federal Liberals intended to increase direct funding of education. Quebec 
student leaders, like their provincial government, were uncomfortable 
with federal funding for education and lobbied for provincial student-
aid. Quebec's policy was that education should remain under provincial 
and Catholic Church control (Neatby, 1993). 
The 1958 NFCUS brief supported federal funding for the proposed 
bursary plan due to the federal government's relatively great financial 
power. However, reflecting Quebec NFCUS members concerns, the brief 
also stated the hope that leaders of both levels of government would find 
it possible to develop an adequate solution that respected the federal sys-
tem, implying a need to change provincial-federal taxation fields. Quebec 
NFCUS members preferred education funding and student-aid under 
direct provincial responsibility and control (see UWO Gazette, 1960, 
Sept. 30) and outside the purview of the Catholic Church. NFCUS's new 
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provincially-focused student-aid lobby seemed to appear suddenly, no 
doubt reflecting a key shift in Quebec's "quiet revolution." NFCUS 
shifted pressure for student bursaries from the federal level to the provin-
cial level while calling for " . . .a new distribution of powers of taxation 
that will enable the provinces to meet their obligations in their respective 
fields of jurisdiction."9 This situation gave impetus to the formation of 
provincial organizations which from that point on had responsibility for 
the student-aid lobby. 
CSLP: STUDENT VICTORY OR BINATIONAL DISASTER? 
The NFCUS federal lobby was officially over, but that did not stop 
individual student councils and provincial components of NFCUS from 
independently lobbying for federal aid. This lobbying and lack of soli-
darity with Quebec's position considerably aggravated "binational" ten-
sions within NFCUS and CUS.10 When the CSLP was legislated in 1964, 
the French-English conflict came to a head — francophone Quebec stu-
dent counci ls wi thdrew f rom CUS and formed the U G E Q (Union 
général des étudiants du Québec). With NFCUS policy firmly incorpo-
rated into the Liberal Party election platform, the field of historical 
action shifted. The Liberal Party and its youth groups emerged as the 
champion of federally-assisted accessibility. NFCUS/CUS, as a national 
or federally-focused collective of student councils, had its hands tied by 
its new policy calling for a provincial focus in its lobby for student bur-
saries. No doubt the provincial focus would have been supported by the 
growing presence of PC-affiliated youth in NFCUS and CUS after 1959. 
Nevertheless, by the time NFCUS officially ceased its federal lobby, the 
ball was rolling for a federal student-aid plan. 
The Liberal Party's adoption of NFCUS's policy in the early 1960s 
was the real point of "victory" for the NFCUS bursary lobby, perhaps 
more so than the actual passing of CSLP legislation in 1964. The NFCUS 
and CUS's official non-involvement in the federal student-aid lobby after 
1961 was of little consequence for the now more generalized student and 
youth movement for federal student-aid. NFCUS and CUS students 
redoubled their lobby at the provincial level. Yet, as individual student 
councils and supporters of the federal Liberal Party, they did what they 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXXI, No. 1, 2001 
Student Organizations as Historical Actors 101 
wanted, which was to lobby federally without concern for official pro-
Constitution and pro-Quebec NFCUS and CUS policy Within NFCUS, 
much was done to consolidate French-English relations, including renam-
ing the organization in 1963. The new CUS structure contained a bina-
t i o n a l v e t o a r r a n g e m e n t , bu t th i s ve to p o w e r , a l o n g w i t h a 
no-federal-lobby policy, was meaningless when individual student coun-
cils acted alone, without regard for NFCUS/CUS policy or Quebec's con-
stitutional rights. The important thing to remember is that NFCUS/CUS's 
lobby on aid between 1961 and 1964 was not nearly as important to the 
establishment of the CSLP as its lobby between 1956 and 1961 where-
upon the Liberal Party adopted, verbatim, NFCUS policy. This is not to 
say that the student lobby for bursaries was unimportant after 1961. 
Despite organizational fragmentation, the lobby remained strong. Even 
the rise of PC youth involvement in NFCUS at this time did not hamper 
the lobby, as PC youth also supported mass student-aid. 
CUS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 
T h a t the s t uden t l obby was ac t ive , de sp i t e C U S ' s S t a n d i n g 
Resolutions 10 and 11, was evident in the House of Commons debates. 
Mr. Ron Basford, MP, provided the most obvious evidence of extensive 
and unofficial CUS activity. He made the following statement: 
This bill is assured, surely, of easy passage through this 
house. This easy passage has been assisted by the work of the 
officers of the CUS who, I think, have become familiar fig-
ures around Parliament Hill during the last few months in 
talking up the case for university loans... All I can say is that 
the students of Canada are well served by the officers of the 
CUS. (House of Commons Debates, July 15, 1964, p. 5524) 
T.C. Douglas, leader of the New Democratic Party, provided further evi-
dence of CUS influence. Douglas stated: 
The Canadian union of university students [sic] has done a 
great deal of work on this matter [how students fund them-
selves to go to university], (House of Commons Debates, July 
15, 1964, p. 5452) 
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Douglas went on in the House to quote, at length, CUS President Patrick 
Kenniff as an authority on the subject of inequality of access. Douglas 
was clearly impressed with CUS and was among its most vocal allies. 
Student leaders' comments were sprinkled in the MP's debates in the 
House of Commons." Had it not been for CUS's official position against 
federal lobbying, I expect their "presence" would have been even greater. 
I should emphasize that it was the Quebec university student councils, 
still official CUS members, who were quoted the most in the House of 
Commons debates over and above the unofficial CUS presence. Quebec 
student leaders, in fact, upholding official NFCUS and CUS policy, spoke 
against CSLP legislation, as did non-Liberal Quebec MPs. They spoke 
against federal student-aid because it undermined provincial jurisdiction 
over education, not because they disagreed with increased student-aid. 
Their position was to change the federal-provincial taxation fields so that 
the provinces could establish their own student-aid programs. 
Just weeks before the loan act was to be legislated, Walter Gordon 
told Cabinet that he was "doubtful the scheme [the proposed student 
loan act] could be put into effect by the beginning of the next academic 
year" (Federal Government of Canada, 1964a). A few days later, Gordon 
made this statement in Cabinet: 
The federal government might, following discussions with the 
provinces, [especially Quebec] have to accept an arrangement 
that was less attractive politically than that originally planned 
— whereby the federal funds involved would be turned over 
to the provinces and the latter would administer the program 
and would tend to receive all the credit. (Federal Government 
of Canada, 1964a, June 9) 
A number of things can be deduced from this situation. First, the pro-
posed legislation was even more complicated than imagined (Federal 
Government of Canada, 1964a, July 9). This would have related mainly 
to complex legal and constitutional matters. Second, Gordon was obvi-
ously concerned with the political effects legislation was going to have 
and did not want the provinces getting any credit. This is evident also in 
Gordon's concern for the wording of the proposed student-loan legisla-
tion — it would have to contain the word "Canada" and play down 
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references to "the role of provincial authorities" (Federal Government of 
Canada , 1964a, July 11). In t e rms of my theore t ica l f r a m e w o r k , 
Gordon's political concerns could be interpreted as a salient moment in 
the articulation of the state's hegemonic power. What better way was 
there to consolidate Liberal Party support (outside of Quebec at least) 
than by harnessing the movement for student-aid that NFCUS and CUS 
had so painstakingly built? The PCs unwillingness to act on NFCUS's 
lobby had cost them dearly. And the minority Liberal government, eager 
for a majority, was not going to waste any time in seizing the opportu-
nity to respond to pent-up public support. 
Immediately after the CSLP was established, there was a contradic-
tory sense of victory and dismay among student leaders. Here is how 
CUS President David Jenkins responded: 
Frankly, interest-free loans won' t solve the problems facing 
Canada's students. What we would really like to see are bur-
saries (based upon need and marks).. . However, if only loans 
and scholarships are possible at this time, we will gratefully 
accept them. (Cord Weekly, 1964a) 
Grateful acceptance translated into a general disorientation, assisted 
by the departure of francophone Quebec student councils from CUS, the 
new concern with rising tuition fees and the process of forming stronger 
provincial wings of CUS. 
I asked all the former student leaders if they thought the lobby for 
student-aid had been successful. I asked them if they thought there was a 
relationship between their lobby and student-aid programs. All of them 
saw a strong correlation. Although their responses are not indisputable 
p roof of s tudent organiza t ion inf luence , their opinions cannot be 
ignored. Walter Tarnopolsky (NFCUS President 1957-58) stated: 
I think all these years of the federal government paying out 
these bursaries, the whole bursary/loan/grant program arose 
out of our rallying cry for 10,000 bursaries . . . I 'm still con-
vinced that this whole student loan and bursary program was 
a result of NFCUS's pushing year in and year out. I don' t 
think there's any doubt about that. We played a major role in 
keeping student views before governments. . .They [AUCC] 
d i d n ' t start it [ s tudent bursa ry lobby] . I mean later we 
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convinced them to participate, but it was all a NFCUS initia-
tive. (personal communication, 1992) 
Student leaders from the early to mid-1960s felt the same way, for exam-
ple, Stewart Goodings (NFCUS President 1962-63) thought: 
The CSLP was the federal government's response to the lob-
bying efforts that NFCUS was making. The government went 
for a loan program; we were suggesting a bursary program. 
NFCUS was not satisfied with the student loan program...the 
feeling of the student leadership was that CSLP had an effect 
on accessibility, but did not go as far as it should have, (per-
sonal communication, 1993) 
Jean Bazin (CUS President 1964-65) stated: 
All I can say, there was a pretty determined effort to do what-
ever [could] be done within the context of the meeting at the 
time, and the sophistication that we had, which was limited. 
But here we were trying. We were a pretty powerful force rel-
ative to that particular question [student-aid], (personal com-
munication, 1993) 
Despite the Quebec and English Canada division and the grumbling 
of CUS supporters about the CSLP being far from the promised mass 
bursary program, after 1964 student-aid had never been so good (UWO 
Gazette, 1964). The CSL Act passed easily. The predicted cries of 
"unconstitutional" from conservative Quebec MPs and future student 
leaders of UGEQ — strange bedfellows indeed — were politically 
expendable, just as they were within NFCUS and CUS. The establishment 
of the CSLP, no doubt, confirmed Quebec youth's growing disillusionment 
with the Canadian state, the consequences of which are well known. 
NFCUS RELATIONS WITH UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATORS 
From at least the mid-1950s it was common practice for members 
of the u n i v e r s i t y p r e s i d e n t s ' Na t iona l C o n f e r e n c e of Canad ian 
Universi t ies (NCCU) to attend NFCUS conferences. From at least 
1959, it became standard practice for NFCUS delegates to attend the 
NCCU national conferences. Here NFCUS delegates politely presented 
their briefs for more student-aid and had an important influence on 
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university president opinion. Paul Becker, a self-proclaimed "insider," 
who was involved in NFCUS between 1959 and 1963 in various staff 
and executive capacities stated: 
O n e of my a c h i e v e m e n t s at th is t ime was to get the 
Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada [which 
the N C C U eventual ly became] to treat us as a s tandard 
agenda item... I used to go.. . Initially we were not taken seri-
ously. We used to form alliances with particular university 
presidents and deans. The key thing we wanted was official 
status but we couldn't do anything. Perhaps it was our own 
inexper ience or an inabil i ty to formula te our object ives 
clearly so that we would be taken seriously by a federation of 
university administrations. As we got better at it we got taken 
more seriously. We got more recognition with persistence and 
achievement... (personal communication, 1992) 
Over time, NFCUS developed allies in the NCCU and the two organiza-
tions together pressured the federal government for university funding. 
However, university administrator relations with the national student 
organization were not always as congenial,12 and deteriorated rapidly after 
September 1964, when, following the establishment of the CSLP, most 
universities substantially hiked tuition fees. The relations of CUS and 
other student groups with university administrators reached an all-time 
low in the late 1960s and early 1970s over a range of issues, from univer-
sity complicity in war-related research, to university governance, to day-
care. When university administrators and national student organization 
leaders were on good terms, mainstream student support for the national 
student organization increased. The opposite was true too, when adminis-
trators withdrew support, the mass of mainstream students did the same. 
In other words, university administrator attitudes toward NFCUS and 
CUS had a structuring effect on how students viewed their own organiza-
tions and leaders. Similarly, when the Liberals favoured NFCUS policy 
on student-aid, this was an impetus for greater student involvement. 
NFCUS's cozy relations with university administrators in the late 
1950s to early 1960s attracted the more conservative (small and large 
"c") students who had previously been unconvinced of NFCUS's value 
and effectiveness. The student councils, which tended to house the more 
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conservative students, started getting more directly involved in NFCUS 
and especially in the politics of the local NFCUS Campus Committees — 
which tended to house those more critical of the status quo. During the 
early 1960s to the mid-1960s, PC-aligned youth gained influence in 
NFCUS/CUS — for example, most of the leaders were PC-affiliated at 
this time. With the federal Liberals in power, an uneasy alliance developed 
on campus among young NDPers and other left-wing elements, and the 
Tories and small "c" conservatives. When "red Tory" philosopher George 
Grant published his Lament for a Nation (1965), this enabled an improba-
ble convergence between Conservative nationalism and the rise of new left 
anti-Americanism (see Christian, 1993; Kostash, 1980). 
THE STRUGGLE FOR BURSARIES AND 
FREE TUITION FEES AFTER 1964 
In the two years after the establishment of CSLP and before the 
establishment of the Ontario Student Assistance Plan (OS AP), leaders of 
CUS and its newly formed affiliate, ORCUS (Ontario Region CUS) con-
tinued lobbying for non-repayable student-aid. Chanting "Grants not 
loans" and after 1964, "Abolish tuition fees," ORCUS was one of the 
most important student organizations to emerge in Ontario (and Canada) 
especially af ter CSLP. ORCUS and CUS continued to pressure the 
provincial and federal governments for a 100% bursary (grant) program 
while lobbying against the unprecedented tuition hikes that came in the 
wake of the CSLP (see Moses, 1995). ORCUS and CUS efforts elicited 
reponse in the form of the Ontario Scholarship and Bursary Assistance 
Fund established in 1964 and OSAP in 1966. In its first year, the schol-
arship and bursary fund provided $750,000 to Ontario universities for 
distribution to students in financial need. The explicit intention of the 
fund was to offset the cost of higher tuition fees for those students in 
greatest need (White, 1965; see also Cook & Stager 1969). 
The Ontario Provincial government was also expecting a federal 
bursary program ( Toronto Star, 1966)13 and when this did not materialize, 
it created this pre-OSAP, ad hoc scholarship and bursary fund with the 
expectation that a federal bursary program would be forthcoming. After 
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giving up on the federal government ' s promise of "10,000 Canada 
Scholarships" (bursaries) and under continued CUS and ORCUS pres-
sure, OSAP was established, replacing the ad hoc scholarship and bur-
sary fund. 
OSAP was an arrangement that combined federal loans (60%) with 
Ontario bursaries (40%). Loans came from the federal government and 
bursaries came from the Ontario provincial government. Bursaries were 
proving to be a valuable means of gaining political support from the 
youthful baby boomers (Ontario Legislative Assembly, 1966b). A "60:40" 
student-aid plan transformed the field of historical action once again. This 
is seen most obviously in CUS's shift of focus away from "universal 
accessibility" to "academocracy" (the democratization of university gover-
nance) and eventually to the temporary disbanding of the national student 
organization in 1969. Like CSLP and earlier token student-aid programs, 
OSAP limited the movement for student-aid and took the sting out of the 
radical left, especially those espousing Marxist-Leninism. 
It is clear that CUS, or at least its provincial component, ORCUS, 
was highly influential. Compare the statements that Bill Davis, former 
Premier of Ontario and Education Minister, was making with those of 
former ORCUS and CUS President Hugh Armstrong. Ontario Premier 
Davis stated: "Some students are building up too great a burden of 
indebtedness while others may be reluctant to go into debt to the extent 
necessary to continue their education" (Ontario Legislative Assembly, 
1966b). CUS President Hugh Armstrong stated, "Loans are not an 
acceptable form of student-aid... Loans are a deterrent rather than an 
incentive" (UWO Gazette, 1966a). Such links reinforce my claim that 
CUS was influencing the thought and actions of the top decision-makers. 
In the leg is la ture deba tes leading to the es tab l i shment of OSAP, 
R.M. Nixon, Leader of the Opposition, stated: 
Other important contributions to the information on university 
education were made by the Canadian union of students [sic] 
who speak clearly, intelligently and effectively for the young 
people directly concerned by the decisions of governments 
and the community with regard to postsecondary education. 
(Ontario Legislative Assembly, 1966c) 
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Nixon used CUS's arguments, for example, that a more educated popula-
tion would allow people to make more money and thus pay more taxes. 
Nixon also called for the abolition of tuition fees and the creation of a 
"real" student assistance program. In one case, during debate, Ontario 
MPs were shamed'into supporting those young adults who would be 
barred f r o m univers i ty because of poor f inancia l c i rcumstances . 
A.B.R. Lawrence, M.P.P., referred to how "more than a handful" of 
those present in the Ontario Legislature had received veteran's assistance 
and for this reason should support student bursaries over student loans 
(Ontario Legislative Assembly, 1966c). 
The O S A P a n n o u n c e m e n t was made in Apri l 1966 (Ontar io 
Legislative Assembly, 1966a). "Things got very active in Ontario," 
according to Hugh Armstrong (personal communication, 1993). When 
ORCUS and CUS leaders heard the news that the federal and provincial 
governments were not going to establish a 100% bursary plan, they were 
disappointed.14 Like CSLP, the ideological effect of OSAP itself was 
rather ambiguous, angering some student leaders and mollifying others 
— the new flock of students were generally happy with the new student-
aid situation, which had never been so good. The letdown over OSAP 
was not the only issue causing friction. At this time, there were many 
simultaneously converging social factors such as demographics (for 
example, massive growth in the 18-24 year old cohort, the increasing 
number of female and working-class students), the intensification of the 
Viet Nam War, a sudden jump in tuition fees and the development of 
y o u t h - c e n t r e d cu l tu res and marke t s . Wi thout doubt , C U S ' s and 
ORCUS ' s main position — the long-held raison d'être for student 
movements in Canada — had become state policy, more or less. This 
policy transformed the field of historical action of the late 1960s and has 
been an instrument of state regulation of student protest ever since. 
Student leaders were unhappy that loans were still a significant part 
of OSAP. Premier Bill Davis quickly responded to student criticism by 
convening a student-faculty-university presidents committee ( U W O 
Gazette, 1966c; see also Toronto Star, 1966). The formation of this 
committee was a significant historic event for CUS and ORCUS. This 
was the first time that students were allowed representation on such a 
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high-profile, advisory committee. The youthful Bill Davis achieved 
respect and political support from many youth. 
CUS and ORCUS never got their 100% bursary program, but they 
certainly had historicity. This is evident in the 40% bursary component 
of OSAP, a frozen tuition fee policy, representation on government com-
mittees and above all, a heightened level of accessibility. Bill Davis 
reflects on his experiences with CUS. He states: 
I think there is a matter of assigning credit where credit is 
due. And to my mind, we must give a great deal of credit to 
our students for creating concern and focusing new attention 
on.. . what a university should be and the manner in which it 
should be organized and operated... It is essential, therefore, 
that we take the time and make the effort to stand back and 
really look at ourselves and the kind of education that we are 
offering and decide whether it matches up to the needs of our 
society. And this, I would assert, is certainly one issue of 
which our students have encouraged us to take note. 
Student unrest or the movement toward student power is, 
without question, the subject of great public attention. Thus it 
would be unrealistic, indeed impossible, to conduct any 
debate on university affairs in the current era without giving 
some attention to this very important aspect of higher educa-
tion. (Ontario Legislative Assembly, 1968) 
From my analysis of student newspapers, it is clear that there was 
widespread indignation on most campuses about the raising of fees, 
which happened soon after CSLP was implemented.15 Unlike student-
aid, tuition fee hikes affected all students directly and at the same time. 
And CUS, whose membership was growing rapidly and becoming more 
inclusive and politically astute, was able to provide national and provin-
cial form to a widespread "free tuition" movement. An early "radical" 
movement was to coalesce within CUS that was based on local protests 
against tuition fees. 
Once CSLP was established, university administrators had the politi-
cal space to raise tuition fees, and they did not hesitate. With many loans 
and bursaries to offer students, university administrators could raise 
tuition fees (a source of private funds) with less risk of criticism, or so 
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they thought. In the mid-1960s, before the Fiscal Arrangements Act of 
1967, the universities alone controlled tuition fee levels. It appears that 
raising tuition fees was the administrators' plan all along. The best evi-
dence for this is found in the final report of the university presidents' 
Commission on University Finance (1965) (the "Bladen Commission"). 
The report contained a key recommendation for higher tuition fees and 
more student loans and bursaries. 
There was already a small new left "radical" campus movement, the 
Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA), which had evolved from the 
Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CUCND) 
(see Kostash, 1980). In 1964-65, SUPA activism was still on the fringes 
of mainstream student council and CUS politics, but this would change 
rapidly. During the mid-1960s, many ORCUS and CUS leaders such as 
Hugh Armstrong became receptive to SUPA's ideas, for example, its 
anti-war position, critique of liberalism and style of protest. As well, 
some SUPA affiliates, recognizing a new critical impulse within main-
s t ream student pol i t ics , became involved with CUS. Laxer (1969) 
remarks that by the 1968-69 academic year, the "staff and intellectual 
apparatus" of the formerly mainstream CUS contained many former 
SUPA activists. It is interesting to note how new left development in 
national student organizations in Canada and the U.S. were quite differ-
ent. Similar to the Canadian situation, the national student organization 
in the U.S., the United States National Student Organization (USNSA) 
provided an organizational network for the development of the new left 
Students for a Democrat ic Society (SDS) (see Johnson, 1998; Sale, 
1973). However, in the U.S., the SDS developed as a separate new left 
organization, while in Canada, CUS (the rough equivalent of USNSA) 
became new left, while maintaining, unlike the SDS, its basis of organi-
zation and representation in local student councils. 
With unexpected and widespread student anger over higher fees and 
a new Black civil rights style of student activism related to SUPA, con-
cerned federal and provincial governments agreed to provide more edu-
ca t ion f u n d i n g . By 1966, adequa te gove rnmen t fund ing re leased 
universities from their intention to raise their fees and, at the same time, 
quelled student indignation and mobilization. The Ontario Scholarship 
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and Bursary Assistance Fund of 1964, discussed earlier, was a political 
opportunity that could not be missed. It also capitalized on the broad 
popularity of student-aid and the failure of the federal government to 
bring in its promised national bursary program. 
In 1967, a stable and "regulated" tuition fee was established under 
the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act (Stager 1989). The fed-
eral government was happy to tie tuition fee levels to its grants to the 
universities, as it looked like CSLP would become a "cash cow" for uni-
versity funding via student tuition fees. No doubt university administra-
tors, who were attentive to the student protests south of the border, were 
relieved that they did not have to face angry students complaining about 
the threats to accessibility and demanding that fees be completely abol-
ished. Although the CUS-coordinated anti-fees movements were co-
opted, they did achieve a frozen-fee policy that increased access to 
postsecondary education in the late 1960s. 
Former University of Toronto President Claude Bissell provides 
some clues as to how university administrators and politicians managed 
campus dissent. Bissell (1974) reasoned: "The key was.. . to keep the tra-
ditional radicals from coalescing with the revolutionaries" (p. 138). The 
radicals were "in the main academic tradition of protest and dissent, now 
organized more carefully, far less respectful than their predecessors" 
whi le the revolut ionar ies "saw themselves as part of a wor ldwide 
ferment, and 'Columbia today, Toronto tomorrow,' was a battle cry in a 
campaign to overthrow the world establishment. What I must do was to 
enlist the radicals in the process of reform. . . to give them an active 
ro le . . . " (p. 129). By giving in to the "radical" anti-fees and bursary 
movements , by enlisting and giving students an active role, such as 
Premier Davis was doing, the "revolutionaries," in fact an assortment of 
conflicting groups and political persuasions, were systemically isolated 
and neutralized. 
Fol lowing various announcements and promises of no more fee 
increases, the anti-fees issue on campus and within CUS dissipated as 
quickly as it had appeared. And like student-aid in general, the tuition fee 
freeze took away a potential catalyst for revolutionary movements that 
saw the university as part of the establishment to be overthrown. Tuition 
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fees were not a major concern for CUS in late 1960s as they were in the 
mid-1960s. University administrator and federal and provincial govern-
ment initiative to control and stabilize tuition fees in the mid-1960s was 
not just a socially-isolated, bureaucratic procedure as Stager (1989) sug-
gests. Tuition fees were frozen as a direct result of student council and 
CUS protest. University administrators were startled and worried by the 
development of social movements among their students: anti-war, anti-
racist, anti-capitalist movements and, by the late 1960s, feminism. It is no 
coincidence that tuition fees remained stable throughout the most radical 
period of Canadian student organization history (1965-1972). 
CONCLUSION 
Accessibility policy should not be seen as just co-optation in the 
zero-sum Marcusian sense. Late 1960s and early 1970s anti-capitalist 
dissent was demobilized and neutralized by liberal-minded university 
administrators and politicians who removed traditional student move-
ment catalysts. Yet access to universities and colleges in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s also ended up playing a key role in the growth of the 
new social movements. So-called "co-optation" was relative and, in fact, 
mult idimensional . In many respects, the new policy environment of 
loans, bursaries and frozen tuition fees enabled social movements as 
much as it restrained them. Unbeknownst to them, student organizations 
of the 1950s to mid-1960s helped open up certain cultural and political 
spaces that gave rise to new identities in new social movements of the 
post-1967 period. This social condition was hardly the one-dimensional 
society that Marcuse warned students of in 1964. Moreover, student 
activism was less a factor of baby-boom demographics and more a factor 
of social actors responding to unjust and undemocratic class- and-gener-
ation-related social relations. 
There was always an ongoing campus debate about the national stu-
dent organization's "value to students" and "effectiveness." NFCUS and 
CUS presidents had to constantly inform students of the merits of collec-
tive action within a national student organization. This merit related not 
just to the organization's bursary lobby but to many other areas that 
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NFCUS/CUS concerned itself with, such as its involvement in the 
International Union of Students or student services. Oftentimes the 
NFCUS president was "fighting brush fires," such as when uninformed 
student council treasurers wondered why they should pay membership 
dues to an "outside" organization, when there were pressing needs at 
home, like bigger floats for the next homecoming parade. Student coun-
cil membersh ip was constantly turning over. This meant N F C U S 
activists had to continually educate the membership and justify the wor-
thiness of NFCUS. So in relation to this long debate as to NFCUS and 
CUS "value to students" and "effectiveness," this paper has finally set 
the record straight. 
Did NFCUS and CUS make a difference? Clearly they did. Student 
agency mattered. This fact should inspire future generations of young 
people. Within the perspective of a revised concept of co-optation that I 
call mutual determination or simply co-optation, one can see how social 
actors in marginal locations, although far away from actual decision-
making, can still influence state policy and ipso facto the very condi-
tions of future social movements. Hence, it is appropriate to say that 
student organizations had historicity. Or, in other words, they helped 
establish certain government policies that reflected their cultural orien-
tations, values and class-related interests. Through their persistent 
efforts, NFCUS and CUS activists had a long lasting democratic effect 
on the social relations of the university and society. In short, NFCUS 
and CUS helped shape the course of Canadian history.4^ 
Notes 
' Meaning "in place of parents" — rules and customs that gave university 
administrators the same rights as parents to dictate behaviour, especially in mat-
ters of moral regulation of student sexuality (for example, residence curfews). 
^ For example, the average bursary given to each recipient in 1961-62 
was $289 (see Table 1), while the average tuition fee at this time was $413 
(based on averaging the tuition fees of the universities of Toronto, Waterloo, 
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Waterloo Lutheran and York. Taken from university course calendars, 
1961-62 academic year. 
3 Defined here as including the federal and provincial contribution of 
scholarships and aid to students attending postsecondary education and the cost 
of making loans to students (not the actual amount of loans). This includes 
interest payments, default and service charges. 
4 NFCUS asked Ontario Premier Frost directly for an additional $1.5 mil-
lion for provincial and dominion-provincial student-aid programs, which would 
have almost quadrupled the student-aid budged. 
^ Honourable Mr. Justice Tarnopolsky, author of The Canadian Bill of 
Rights (1966), appointed Judge of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, 1983. 
6 See also The Varsity, 1959a and UWO Gazette, 1959b which provide 
details of NFCUS Executive Secretary André L'Heureux's letter regarding 
the cuts. 
^ For example, by the 1963-64 academic year, there were 17 "minority 
governments," 14 Liberal, 2 PC and 1 NDP (see Cord Weekly, 1964b). Yearly 
model parliaments were much more important campus events than they are 
today (see Moses, 1995, pp. 225-239). 
8 The CSLP bill passed 137 to 14. Six PCs and eight Créditistes opposed 
because federal aid to education was unconstitutional (Gordon, 1977). 
9 See NFCUS resolutions 67/NA/61 and 71/NA/61 in NFCUS resolutions 
(1961), which were reaffirmed and carried as standing resolutions 10 and 11 at 
the 1962 NFCUS Congress, NFCUS resolutions (1962). 
1 0 Please recall that NFCUS became CUS in 1963. So by the time of 
CSLP legislation in 1964, we must refer to "CUS." Adding to the confusion is 
that fact that francophone Quebec members withdrew from CUS in 1964, not 
from NFCUS which had changed its name the year before. 
H See, for example, University of Toronto's Student Administrative 
Council President John Roberts quoted July 21, 1964; CUS President David 
Jenkins quoted July 15, 1964, House of Commons Debates. 
See, for example, The Varsity, January 21 and 24, 1955 and "The 
President Speaks..." (extracts from a University of Toronto President's report) 
in The Varsity, January 31, 1955, p. 4. 
See also Davis' comments in the Ontario Legislature, June 20, 1966. 
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See the Toronto Star, September 25, 28, and 29, 1966. See also the 
UWO Gazette, (1966a, 1966b); Cord Weekly, (1966). 
1 5 See, for example, UWO Gazette (1965); Cord Weekly (1965); Lambda 
(1965). See also Policy Declaration/4/64, CUS Resolutions, (1964). 
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